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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The statement of issues set forth in Appellant's brief 
is unnecessarily repetitious* The sole issue before this Court 
on appeal is: 
Did Appellant's Lis Pendens, which contained a 
street address and a legal description of one 
of the two parcels now claimed by Appellant, 
provide constructive notice of Appellant's 
claim to an interest in the parcel of property 
for which no legal description was given in 
the Lis Pendens. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HANS C. RILLING, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, and KAY M. 
LEWIS, ESQ., Trustee, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
Case No. 860499 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL CORPORATION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent First Security Financial Corporation (herein-
after "First Security") does not dispute Appellant Hans C. 
Rilling's (hereinafter "Rilling") Statement of the Case and 
adopts that statement by reference herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rilling's Statement of Facts contains several factual 
misstatements. Those misstatements are as follows: 
1. The property at issue in this litigation consists 
of two parcels located in Ogden, Utah. The legal descriptions of 
these two parcels of property are as follows: 
Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden City, 
Weber County, Utah: Beginning on the East 
line of Fillmore Avenue, 280.81 feet South 58' 
East of 28th Street; thence South 89°2'East 
150 feet; thence North 58' West 10 feet; 
thence North 59°29'40" West 172.41 feet, more 
or less, to Fillmore Avenue; thence South 58' 
West to beginning. (Hereinafter Parcel "A.") 
Also, a Part of Lot 4, MAULE ADDITION, Ogden 
City, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at a 
point 480 feet North 0°58' East from the 
Southwest corner of said Block 4, and running 
thence North 0°58' 120 feet along the East 
side of Fillmore Avenue; thence South 89°02' 
East 280.89 feet; thence South 0°58' West 120 
feet; thence North 89°02' West 280.89 feet to 
the place of beginning. Situated in the 
Southwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 34, Township 6 North, Range 1 West, 
Salt Lake City Meridian, U.S. Survey. [R.57-
58.] (Hereinafter Parcel "B.") 
2. Paragraph 2 of Rillingfs Statement of Facts pro-
vides the legal description of both parcels of property at issue 
in this appeal. Rilling identifies the first parcel as Parcel A 
and indicates that it is the larger parcel of property, the 
parcel not identified in Rilling's Lis Pendens. In fact, the 
first parcel described above (Parcel A) is the smaller of the two 
parcels, and a legal description of that parcel is set forth in 
Rilling's Lis Pendens. [Record at 18 (attached as Exhibit "A" to 
Rilling's Brief).] Conversely, the second parcel of property 
described above, identified in this and in Rilling's Brief as 
Parcel B, is the larger of the two parcels. No legal description 
of this parcel is contained in Rilling's Lis Pendens. [Record at 
18.] 
3. Paragraph 5 of Rilling's Statement of Facts notes 
that his Lis Pendens contained a legal description of the smaller 
parcel of property, Parcel A. Rilling again erroneously iden-
tifies that parcel as Parcel B. While Rilling notes in that same 
paragraph 5 that the Lis Pendens referred to an attached valua-
tion notice, "also setting forth the legal description" of the 
property, Rilling omits to note that no such Valuation Notice was 
attached to the Lis Pendens as recorded. [See Record at 18-19.] 
4. Rilling fails to note that it is undisputed that 
First Security had no actual knowledge or notice of Rilling1s Lis 
Pendens or of any claim by Rilling to any interest in Parcel B 
when First Security made a loan secured by an interest in Parcel 
B to Marsha Rilling. [Record at 76-77.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
First Security does not dispute the priority of 
Rillingfs interest in Parcel A of the property, by virtue of the 
priority of the recordation of Rilling's Lis Pendens. No issue 
is before the Court as to the rights of the parties in Parcel A. 
Likewise, it is undisputed that First Security was unaware of 
Rilling's Lis Pendens and of any claim by Rilling to any interest 
in Parcel B when First Security made its loan. Thus, the issues 
before the Court are concerned solely with whether Rilling's Lis 
Pendens gave First Security constructive notice of a claim by 
Rilling to an interest in Parcel B. 
Because Rilling's Lis Pendens does not describe Parcel 
B it provided no notice of any claim by Rilling to any interest 
in Parcel B. As to Parcel B, the lien of First Security has 
priority. Utah statute requires that a recorded instrument 
contain a legal description of the property affected by the 
instrument. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10. Rilling's Lis Pendens, 
which contained a legal description of only Parcel A, provided 
notice of a claim by Rilling only as to that parcel of property. 
Because the Lis Pendens contained no legal description of and 
provided no notice, actual or constructive, of Rilling1s claim to 
Parcel B, Rilling1 s claim to that parcel is subordinate to that 
of First Security. 
It is undisputed that First Security was unaware of 
Rillingfs Lis Pendens when First Security made its loan to Marsha 
Rilling. Rilling's theory that his Lis Pendens should have 
alerted First Security to sufficient facts to cause it to inquire 
further is, thusf based on an erroneous factual premise. Because 
First Security had no knowledge of the Lis Pendens, the Lis 
Pendens could not have alerted First Security to any facts. 
Thus, the sole issue before this Court on the undisputed facts of 
this case is whether Rilling's Lis Pendens provided First 
Security constructive notice of a claim by Rilling to an interest 
in Parcel B. 
Moreover, even had First Security been aware of the Lis 
Pendens, that document does not contain any facts that would have 
alerted First Security to Rilling's undisclosed claim to a parcel 
of property not described in the Lis Pendens. In this respect, 
the holding of the Washington Supreme Court in Koch v. Swanson, 
481 P.2d 915 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), is directly analogous, and 
the trial court correctly applied and relied on that case. 
ARGUMENT 
I . RILLING \S I I P PENDENS PROVIDED NO 
NOTTTE OF r TLAIM TO PARCEL B. 
~
:
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t h o s e who s t r i c t , l y c o m p l y w i t h t h e s t a l u t o i ' y r e q u i r e m e n t s , For 
e x a m p l e r t h e Wyoming S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t , " t h e r e c o i i l i n g 
o r t i l i n g ' i-1 -nil i nM r nun II! IJI-VI-I c o n s t i I u t e s c o n s t r u c t i v e n o t i c e 
u n l e s s t h e s t a t u t e s p e r t a i n i n g ti- r e c o r d i n g dnd f i l i n g .-ire c o m -
p l i e d w i t h . * . . C h e y e n n e N a t '"" 1 Hank v . C111 zeu" s S a v i n g s 
Bank,, 391 P.2d 933, 935 (Wyo. 1964). The Colorado Court of 
Appeals has likewise held that: 
The recording of documents constitutes 
constructive notice only if it is so provided 
by statute. . . . Further, there must be 
strict compliance with the provisions of the 
statute, ordinance or regulation for such 
notice to be effective. . . . If the ap-
plicable statute or ordinance is not strictly 
followed, constructive notice cannot be im-
puted to anyone. 
Arapahoe Land Title, Inc. v. Contract Financing, Ltd., 472 P. 2d 
754, 755-56 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970)(cites omitted). ^A; 
Strict adherence to statutory recordation requirements 
is essential to the functioning of the land recordation system. 
The recordation system provides a convenient and inexpensive way 
for those claiming interests in land to provide the public with 
notice of those interests, and for the public to ascertain the 
ownership of particular parcels of land. The system works, 
however, only if the public can rely on the contents of recorded 
documents as accurate statements of the interests claimed. Thus, 
recorded instruments are uniformly deemed to provide constructive 
notice only of their own contents and of other documents referred 
to by them. E.g., Caito v. United California Bank, 576 P.2d 466, 
470 (Cal. 1978). 
The Lis Pendens recorded by Rilling on May 11, 1983 
recites that the real property affected by the Lis Pendens is 
located at 2810 Fillmore Avenue, Ogden, Utah. The Lis Pendens 
then provides a legal description of Parcel A. No description of 
Parcel B is set forth in the Lis Pendens. Rilling1s theory now 
QX-
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r e q u j *- - • «rnci*jii< t » c o n t d i ' ) ! - q ^ 1 P S C > i * , ' " h e 
p r o p e r t y a f f e c t e d ^y i h e L ^ J P e n d e n s .
 t B L i e t OJ. A p p e l l a n t , a t 
] 3 ] 
R - ' 1 ' ! " - * ' " u s e s h i r " l a i n : h a * i 7 i s P* vl •»* *; *** iwt 
e o r v a i n a i ^ n ^ i r)oc,.v i pt j " p *'f * <^ :*: i^^ - -if^^rf- ~«~* ,_t on 
U t a h Code Arm, * i .- * ututory 
requirements r i i Pendens VnoTJi >t h« r l . h m o . • *> ,• s^ f i n n 
r e q u i r e s f ° * * a UJ.O p p n - i r " ' " j n t a i n , a c^ : p» 
|)»! i . ^ountv a f \ , , ^ e r e b " " Utah Code A n n , 4^  -
2 . From ;;:i ' , no -.-» •' ud *-»?•> * ^ i* f r i *- *^ «' ^ n t i r y 
r e o ; ; \ rem^r" *-**•• • . <s 
see :;•;-• > T specifically require a legal description 
oJ !< propert- <** icf of Apppl I ai -
f 
Utah Code Ann . • .' • i *: - >>et i- n provide? •
 s* 
A11 instruments executed after Ju1y 1, 1 961 
which release or assign a mortgage, deed of 
trust, lease or other documents creating a 
lien or encumbrance on real property, shall 
not be entitled to recordation in the office 
of any county recorder unless said instruments 
contain a legal description of the real pro-
perty affected thereby. All county recorders 
shall refuse to accept the same for recording 
until said real property description is in-
serted . 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10 (emphasis added.) An amendment to this 
section effective July 1, 1983
 f did not alter the relevant re-
quirement that a recorded instrument must contain a legal des-
cription of the property affected by the instrument. Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-3-10 (1986). Rilling's Lis Pendens, which purported to 
create a lien against the property in favor of Rilling, was, 
thus, subject to the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10 that 
it contain a legal description of the property affected by the 
Lis Pendens. 
Section 57-3-10 specifies that documents that do not 
contain a legal description of the property affected shall not be 
recorded. That provision did not bar the recordation of 
Rilling's Lis Pendens, however, because the Lis Pendens contained 
a legal description of Parcel A. The county recorder therefore 
received Rilling's Lis Pendens and entered the Lis Pendens in the 
abstract showing the chain of title of Parcel A. [Record at 
82.] But the recorder had no way of knowing that Rilling also 
asserted a claim against Parcel B, property that was not des-
cribed in the Lis Pendens. Thus the Lis Pendens was not entered 
in and does not appear in the abstract showing the chain of title 
as to Parcel B. [Record at 82.] Rilling's Lis Pendens simply 
gave neither the county recorder nor any other party notice of 
any claim by Rilling of an interest in Parcel B, because the Lis 
Pendens did not comply with Section 57-3-10. 
B. The Structure of Utah's Recordation System Requires 
That Recorded Documents Contain Legal Descriptions 
of the Property Affeeted by Them. 
Ri ] ] :i ng '" s suggestion that the street address contained 
\ i <- P e n l ^ n s p r o v ido " * . u* * - ^  i-<;r» , r»t 1 
n ^ D ° T 
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the types of indices which a county recorder's office must main-
tain. Among these indices is an abstract record: 
which shall show by tracts or parcels every 
conveyance or encumbrance, or other instrument 
recorded, the date and character of the in-
strument , time of filing the same, and the 
book and page and entry number where the same 
is recorded, which record shall be kept so as 
to show a true chain of title to each tract or 
parcel and the encumbrances thereon as shown 
by the records of the office. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6 (1973). In the present case, First 
Security could only have identified who owned or claimed to own 
an interest in Parcel B by examining the abstract index. None of 
the other statutorily required indices under Utah Code Ann. § 17-
21-6 would have identified a "true chain of title to each tract 
or parcel." 
An abstract record, however, is and must be organized 
according to the legal description of the property contained in 
the instruments of record. Thus, the statutory requirement of 
section 57-3-10 that a recorded document contain a legal descrip-
tion of the property affected is essential to the recordation 
system. Only that requirement allows the recorder to maintain 
the statutorily mandated abstract index "showing a true chain of 
title" to property. The present case clearly illustrates the 
importance of these principles. Because Rillingfs Lis Pendens 
did not comply with section 57-3-10, the recorder was unaware 
that Rilling asserted any claim to Parcel B. The Lis Pendens, 
thus, was not recorded in and does not appear in the chain of 
title to Parcel B. 
T a e K a n s a s .Supreme '* >-u ' .1 ca^v df idiooi 
r e v i e w - .-*.• - i^ o r o p e r t - " «it :>.*t ^ 
r e q u i r e d
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c o u r t n o t e d : 
It also seems obvious to us that the purpose 
of the statutes authorizing the recording of 
the instruments of conveyance is to impart to 
a subsequent purchaser notice of instruments 
which affect the title to a specific tract of 
land in which the subsequent purchaser is 
interested at the time. From a reading of all 
of the statutory provisions together, we have 
concluded that the legislature intended that 
recorded instruments of conveyance, to impart 
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser 
or mortgagee, should describe the land con-
veyed with sufficient specificity so that the 
specific land conveyed can be identified. As 
noted above, K.S.A. 58-2203 and 58-2204 re-
quire a deed to describe the premises. A 
description of the property conveyed should be 
considered s u fficie n t i f it i d e n t i f i e s th e 
property or affords the means of identifica-
tion within the instrument itself or by 
specific reference to other instruments re-
corded in the office the register of deeds. 
Such a specific description of the property 
conveyed is required in order to impart con-
structive notice to a subsequent purchaser. 
Luthi v. Evans, 576 P.2d at 1070j The court in Luth carefully 
noted, however, that a "Mother Hubbard" clause could be deemed a 
sufficient description of the property conveyed for purposes 
other than recordation. Thus, as between the parties to the 
instrument, a "Mother Hubbard" clause "is valid, enforceable, and 
effectively transfers the entire property interest." Luth v. 
Evans, 576 P.2d at 1070. 
In the present case, Utah's recording act statutes 
reveal the same purpose as those of Kansas. Utah's statutes 
require that documents be recorded "so as to show a true chain of 
title to each tract or parcel." Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-6. This 
Court should find, as did the court in Luth, that achievement of 
that purpose requires that recorded documents contain a legal 
description of the property affected by the documents. 
Because Rilling's Lis Pendens does not properly describe 
any claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B and does not 
appear in the record chain of title to that parcel, it provides 
no constructive notice of any claim by Rilling to that parcel. 
See Federal Land Bank of Berkeley v. Pace, 48 P. 2d 480, 483-84 
(Utah 1935) (bank which held an equitable lien against 2.75 acre 
tract was not entitled to priority over subsequent purchaser of 
the tract where "there is nothing on the record which could give 
notice to third persons.") As the Colorado Court of Appeals has 
noted: 
[I]nterested parties with no actual or con-
structive notice of prior conveyances or 
encumbrances may rely on and are bound by the 
recorded history of the title. 
Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 703 P.2d 601, 602-03 (Ct. App. 
Colo. 1985). See 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 99 
("A person in dealing with another in respect to real estatef may 
rely on the record title to the property, in the absence of 
actual knowledge of the title in fact, or of facts sufficient to 
put him on inquiry in respect thereto."). 
Rilling's first argument that his Lis Pendens satisfies 
Utah's recordation requirements in describing the property by 
means of a street address is untenable. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-10 
clearly requires that recorded instruments contain a legal des-
cription of the property affected by those instruments. That 
requirement is essential to the functioning of the public record 
system, because only such legal descriptions can provide a basis 
for indexing and searching the public records. 
II. FIRST SECURITY WAS NOT ALERTED TO FACTS THAT SHOULD 
HAVE CAUSED IT TO HAVE DISCOVERED RILLING'S CLAIM. 
Rilling next argues that his Lis Pendens contained 
sufficient facts to have caused First Security to inquire further 
and to have discovered Rilling's claim to Parcel B, even if the 
Lis Pendens does not comply with the Utah statutory requirements 
by providing a legal description of Parcel B. Rilling's Lis 
Pendens could have alerted First Security to facts calling for 
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further inquiry, however, only if First Security had known of the 
Lis Pendens. It is undisputed that First Security had no actual 
knowledge of Rilling's Lis Pendens when First Security made its 
loan to Marsha Rilling. [Record at 76.] Thus, the only issue 
before this Court is whether Rilling's Lis Pendens provided First 
Security with constructive notice of Rilling1s claim to Parcel B. 
As set forth above, Rilling's Lis Pendens did not provide any 
such constructive notice. 
Even if it is assumed that First Security was aware of 
Rilling's Lis Pendens, however, the Lis Pendens does not contain 
any facts that should have caused First Security to inquire 
beyond the face of the recorded Lis Pendens. Rilling bases his 
claim that his Lis Pendens created a duty of further inquiry on 
what he advances as the "general rule" that a recorded instrument 
may place the public on notice of a claim if it contains suffi-
cient facts to "suggest further inquiry." [Brief of Appellant at 
11.1 
Rilling fails to cite, however, the equally general rule 
that the principle of inquiry notice is limited by the rule that: 
[T]he record is notice only so far as the land 
is correctly described, unless it is apparent 
from the record itself that there is a mis-
description. 
66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and Recording Laws § 143. This limitation 
on the scope of inquiry notice recognizes that correct property 
descriptions are essential to functioning of the entire recorda-
tion system, and that the requirement of correct property des-
criptions simply cannot be waived. Apart from the fact that 
principles of inquiry notice are not applicable to this case, 
because inquiry notice extends only insofar as the property has 
been correctly described, however , Rilling cannot show that his 
Lis Pendens placed First Security on inquiry notice as to any 
claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B. 
Rilling bases his claim of inquiry notice on three 
facts: First
 f he argues the property "was used in its entirety 
as a single family residence"; secondf his Lis Pendens contained 
the street address of the entire property; and, third, "Hans and 
Marsha Rilling were involved in a divorce proceeding." [Brief of 
Appellant, at 13.] None of these facts could provide First 
Security with any notice of a claim by Rilling to an interest in 
a parcel of property not described in the Lis Pendens. 
The alleged fact that the two parcels of property at 
2810 Fillmore Avenue "was used in its entirety as a single family 
residence" simply does not appear anywhere, directly or by in-
ference, in the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens merely provides a 
street address and a metes and bounds description of a certain 
parcel of real property, Parcel A. The Lis Pendens says nothing 
of the use of the property, improvements on the property, or the 
nature of the property. 
Moreover, information as to the prior use of property 
affords little by way of prediction regarding its future use. 
Family farms that have been held and used as a single tract for 
generations are regularly partitioned. A duplex used as a single 
family residence may be divided into separate tracts* In a 
divorce, the husband may acquire title to a garage where he has a 
shop or conducts his business at family home, while the wife 
acquires title to the home. The fact that Parcels A and B had 
been held in common would, in no respect, preclude a decree 
partitioning the property. Any prior use of the- property stands 
outside the facts disclosed by an examination of record, and 
provides no basis for questioning the description of property 
claimed by Rilling in his Lis Pendens. 
The fact that Hans and Marsha Rilling were engaged in 
divorce proceedings, likewise, provided First Security with no 
notice that the property description set forth in Rilling's Lis 
Pendens was in error. There is no rationale means by which First 
Security could have gone from the fact of the divorce proceedings 
to the conclusion that Rilling must have claimed an interest in 
property other than that described in the Lis Pendens. 
Finally, Rilling argues that his Lis Pendens contains 
the street address for both parcels of property and that the 
street address should have alerted First Security to Rilling's 
claim to an interest in both parcels. It should be noted, first, 
that it is unclear whether the street address given in Rilling's 
Lis Pendens identifies both parcels of the property in any rele-
vant sense. Speculation that someone examining only the street 
address set forth in the Lis Pendens, might have wondered about 
the extent of property claimed under the Lis Pendens, does no 
more than emphasize the inadequacy of street addresses for pur-
poses of recordation and determining the notice imparted by 
recorded documents. 
The legal description for Parcel A set forth in 
Rilling1s Lis Pendens, however, eliminated any basis for doubt as 
to the property claimed by Rilling in the Lis Pendens* The fact 
that Rilling provided an accurate and complete description of 
Parcel A in the Lis Pendens negates any inference that he as-
serted some unarticulated claim against any other property. As 
this Court has previously held, consistent with longstanding 
common law principles, where a conveyance contains both a legal 
description of the property conveyed and a more general descrip-
tion, the specific legal description controls in the event of any 
conflict or uncertainty. Neeley v^ Kelsch, 600 P.2d 979, 982 J*^ 
(Utah 1979). S^ /? 9fr^L <*" ("a particular is 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED AND ADOPTED THE 
HOLDING OF KOCH V. SWAN5QN. 
Rilling finally argues that the trial court misapplied 
the holding of the Washington Court of Appeals in the case of 
Koc h v^ S w a n son , 481 P.2d 915 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971). Kochy 
however, does no more than reiterate certain fundamental statu-
tory and common law principles regarding the recordation system. 
First, Koch stands for the principle that property must be cor-
rectly and accurately described in a recorded instrument in order 
for notice to be given of a party's interest in that parcel of 
property. Second, Koch stands for the principle that where a 
parcel of property that actually exists is described in a re-
corded instrument, the instrument provides no notice that other 
or different property may also be claimed under the instrument. 
Stated differently, where an actually existing parcel of property 
is described in a recorded instrument, the public is not placed 
on notice or duty of inquiry that the instrument affects property 
other than the property described in the instrument. 
Koch is, however, particularly relevant to this case 
because of its factual similarity to the present case. In Koch, 
the Swansons mortgaged property to plaintiffs, the Kochs, des-
cribed as: 
The West 196.96 feet of the north 1-1/2 of 
Tract 125 of Opportunity, except the South 169 
2/3 feet thereof. . . . 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 916. The Kochs' trust deed was 
properly recorded on June 30, 1965. The Swansons, however, owned 
no interest in tract 125; instead, they owned tract 124. On July 
7, 1965, the Swansons mortgaged a parcel of property, to Pacific 
First Federal described as: 
The West 186.96 feet of the North half of 
Tract 124 of Opportunity, as per plat thereof 
recorded in Volume "K" of Plats, page 20 
except THE SOUTH 169 2/3 RODS FEET THEREOF. . 
• • 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 916. The mortgage in favor of 
Pacific First Federal was recorded a week after the Kochs' 
mortgage. 
The Kochs initiated an action to foreclose on their 
mortgage, alleging that their lien was prior to that of Pacific 
First Federal. It was the Kochs1 theory against Pacific First 
Federal that: 
[S]ince the only difference in description in 
the several conveyances is with respect to 
tract number, such similarities should have 
excited inquiry on the part of [Pacific First 
Federal] leading to discovery of the error in 
description and thus knowledge of plaintiffs' 
mortgage. 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917. In rejecting this argument and 
in holding that the Kochs' recorded mortgage provided no con-
structive or inquiry notice as to any claim by the Kochs to an 
interest in Tract 124, the Washington court relied on the general 
principle that property must be correctly described in order to 
provide inquiry or constructive notice. The court held that: 
Where existing property is described, the 
index and the recorded document imparts notice 
only as to matters within its chain of title 
. . . . Therefore, one searching the index 
has a right to rely upon what the index and 
recorded document discloses and is not bound 
to search the record outside the chain of 
title of the property presently being con-
veyed. 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917 (cites omitted). 
To the same effect is Lake Louise Marie Community Assoc. 
v. Lake Louise Marie Corp., 266 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1966), where the 
court held that a lis pendens that did not accurately describe 
the property subject to litigation failed to provide constructive 
notice. Similarly, in Dorsch v. Jenkins, 365 A. 2d 861, 863-64 
(Pa, Super. Ct. 1976), the court held that a property description 
identifying only the address of property was defective and pre-
vented a lis pendens from providing constructive notice. 
Koch is factually analogous to this case and the trial 
court correctly applied the principles of Koch in deciding this 
case. As in Koch, Rilling's Lis Pendens described a parcel of 
property that actually exists, Parcel A. Rilling's Lis Pendens 
was recorded, in conformity with Utah's recordation statutes, in 
the chain of title to Parcel A; but the Lis Pendens does not 
appear in the chain of title as to Parcel B. Rilling's Lis 
Pendens, therefore, provided inquiry and constructive notice as 
to Rilling's claim to an interest in Parcel A. The Lis Pendens 
did not, however, provide any notice or raise any duty of inquiry 
with respect to Parcel B, for inquiry notice does not arise where 
a recorded instrument correctly describes existing property. 
As the Washington court noted in Koch the argument of 
the Koch's, and in this case of Rilling, that the public could 
not rely on property descriptions set forth in recorded instru-
ments, 
would impose an almost impossible burden upon 
a party seeking to become a bona fide pur-
chaser in that each and every conveyance shown 
of record involving a common grantor would 
have to be investigated beyond the auditor's 
records for possible error to avoid a claim of 
inquiry notice. This would destroy the 
strength of our recording system and any 
justifiable reliance thereon. 
Koch v. Swanson, 481 P.2d at 917-18. Such a holding in this case 
would have a similar effect on Utah's recordation system. 
Rilling's Lis Pendens must, therefore, be held to have raised no 
inquiry notice regarding any claim by Rilling to property other 
than Parcel A, which was described in the Lis Pendens. 
CONCLUSION 
First Security had no actual knowledge of Rilling's Lis 
Pendens, so the only issue before this Court is whether that Lis 
Pendens gave constructive notice of Rilling's claim to an inter-
est in Parcel B. Under Utah law, a street address is not a 
t 
sufficient description of property for recording purposes. 
Rilling's Lis Pendens, which provided a legal description of 
Parcel A, provided constructive notice of Rilling's claim to that 
parcel only. Because no legal description of Parcel B appears in 
the Lis Pendens and because the Lis Pendens does not appear in 
the record chain of title to Parcel B, it provides no construc-
tive notice of any claim by Rilling to an interest in Parcel B. 
No facts set forth in Rilling's Lis Pendens could have 
alerted First Security to any claim by Rilling to Parcel B or 
have caused First Security to make inquiryf because First 
Security was unaware of the Lis Pendens. Even had First Security 
been aware of the Lis Pendensf however, nothing in that document 
should have caused First Security to inquire further. Because 
Rillingfs Lis Pendens described an existing parcel of property, 
Parcel Af the Lis Pendens created no duty of inquiry as to any 
claim Rilling might have to other property. 
Because First Security had no constructive or inquiry 
notice regarding any claim by Rilling to Parcel B the trial court 
correctly ruled that the lien of First Security is superior to 
any claim by Rilling to Parcel B. 
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